1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

*175 665 the Kuomintang, controlling more political machinery and more key appointments than any other faction — was known for its impatient policy of direct repression, and its preference for the use of force in extirpating any challenge to its supremacy. Its strength came from the brothers Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en Li-fu, nephews of an early political patron of Chiang Kai-shek and confidential secretaries to the Generalissimo who helped to engineer his original rise to power. The Political Science Group — made up of experienced bureaucrats and administrators, with something of the subtlety and refinement of the old mandarinate — preferred moderation whenever possible.

Both factions, however, required a strong military leader as a pivot around which to revolve, and both always revolved around Chiang Kai-shek. They have been used by him, at his discretion, in alternating phases of policy. They represent different expressions of the Confucian tradition that the function of officials is not to represent the people but to rule over them. Despite the friction of rivalry between them they held basically the same view with regard to minority peoples within the Chinese realm: these peoples are not entitled to equal representation in a Chinese federation, but should be ruled over by the Chinese.

*175 642 ● This view differs from that of Sun Yat-sen, who definitely recognized the Moslem Turkis (the Uighurs) in Sinkiang as a distinct nationality. According to Article Four of his National Reconstruction Program, and also the Declaration of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924, all such "nationalities" in China are entitled to self-determination. Sun Yat-sen only developed this view fully at the very end of his life, almost certainly under the influence of Russian and Chinese Communist advisers, and probably under the influence of the successful example of the Soviet policy toward national minorities. After the death of Sun Yat-sen, however, this approach was abandoned by the Kuomintang. Even Kuomintang members who recognized the distinct nationality of such peoples as the Uighurs had no policy providing for self-determination in practice. The narrowest

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

175* 642

view of all is well expressed by Li Tung-fang, a historian patronized by the C.C. Clique, who asserted that the Uighurs are descended from the Huns, that the Huns (Hsiungnu) were in turn descended from the ancient Chinese, and that therefore there is no real difference of "nationality" between Uighurs and Chinese.[57]

The latest trend of Kuomintang theory was to ignore self-determination, and to discuss instead "equality of treatment" and "promotion of autonomous government." Both formulas, as will be seen, are subject to very special interpretation. At the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek declared that the essence of nationalism was to liberate the Chinese and to treat all nationalities within China on a basis of equality. In November 1944 Sun Fo restated this view.[58] The practical limits of this approach were laid down by Li Tung-fang, in stating the opinion that self-government — not self-determination — should not be applied to a unit larger than a district within a province, and should never be extended to a whole province. Chang Chih-chung apparently feared that self-determination might lead automatically to secession and independence. In a speech at Urumchi on May 18, 1947, when he was Governor of Sinkiang, he declared that though "scores of years or several centuries hence" Sinkiang might become independent, it could not be independent now.[59] Thus, in the later trend of Kuomintang theory, self-determination has apparently been fully identified with independence.

Under actual conditions in China, however, a demand for self-determination is not necessarily the same thing as a demand for independence. "Self-determination" is often in fact an assertion of the right to stay within the Chinese comity on the basis of a federation of provinces with equal status, and the demand for self-

[57] Li Tung-fang, "Are the People of Sinkiang Turki?" in *Altai*, Chungking, April 25, 1945, Vol. 1, No. 2 (in Chinese).

[58] Speech by Sun Fo at the celebration in Chungking of the twenty-seventh anniversary of the founding of the Soviet State, November 1944.

[59] Speech by Chang Chih-chung published in *Hsinchiang Jih Pao* (*Sinkiang Daily*), Urumchi, August 14, 1947 (in Chinese).

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

*175 642 determination often stems not from separatism but from resistance to the assertion of a central dictatorship over outlying provinces.

Thus the *New York Times* correspondent Tillman Durdin, in a Mukden dispatch of February 3, 1948, noted that "Perhaps the main cause of bitterness against the government among the Manchurians has been the policy of officials appointed by Nanking of treating the Manchurians as a people to be dominated militarily and exploited economically." The "Manchurians" are, of course, Chinese, closely related to the main stock of North China. The situation in Sinkiang, where most of the people are not Chinese, is similar but more marked. Thus even Masud Sabri, an Uighur who was regarded by other Uighurs as subservient to the C.C. Clique, felt constrained to say in 1945 that while the war against Japan was still going on the main characteristics of Chungking policy in Sinkiang were military domination by a large number of troops who were regarded as "human-faced locusts," and promotion of the kind of Chinese colonization that had contributed so much to such uprisings as that in Komul.[60]

*175 701 When Sheng Shih-ts'ai left Sinkiang in September 1944 he left behind six divisions of his own troops. In addition, four divisions of Chungking troops had already entered the province. Two divisions of Chinese Moslem cavalry from Ch'inghai were added a year later, bringing the total up to twelve divisions. Strong fortifications facing west were then built, and though there have been a number of reorganizations, the total military force has remained at about 100,000.[61] The economic strain and social friction associated with the maintenance of such a force in a distant and thinly inhabited province have been described by a Chinese

[60] *New York Times*, January 30, 1948. The comment on troops by Masud Sabri is contained in his article "Regarding Politics in the Northwest," in *Altai*, Chungking, April 25, 1945 (in Chinese).

[61] This figure was reported by Frank Robertson, who in 1947 spent about eight months in Sinkiang. See his dispatch of January 28, 1948, published in *New York Times*, February 1, 1948. For military establishment at the time Sheng Shih-ts'ai left Sinkiang, see press interview with Chang Chih-chung published in *Hsinchiang Jih Pao (Sinkiang Daily)*, Urumchi, July 4, 1947 (in Chinese).

2: Norins S-4 (1939-1941) 1944 All Sinkiang All

VII

CLEAN GOVERNMENT

642 SINKIANG as a Chinese province has existed for less than three-quarters of a century, and even during that period it has been not so much a province as a Chinese outpost and dependency. The changes in Sinkiang since Sheng Shih-ts'ai came to power have brought a new administrative pattern, one which has been summed up in the Six Great Policies as "Clean Government." This new political structure came partially as the result of close ties to Sovietism; but it has never meant surrender of Sinkiang autonomy to Soviet Russia. "Clean Government" has been, instead, an effort to improve upon old Chinese institutions and upon the treatment formerly allotted to the Sinkiang natives.

Han Relations with Ancient Sinkiang (Western Regions)

175 642 The degree and type of influence which China has exerted in Sinkiang has in a sense varied with the good or bad fortune of effective Chinese control over that dependency. For the purposes of this study the Han (B.C. 206-220 A.D.), T'ang (618-907), Ta Ch'ing or Manchu (1644-1912), and Republican (1912-present) epochs have been selected as periods which modern Chinese themselves view as outstanding for effective Chinese influence in Sinkiang. Though there has been considerable difference in particulars, up to the inception of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's administration there ran through them all a like—though in many ways maturing—thread of colonial policy.

In Han times when Chinese first began to assert their colonial influence in Central Asia they sent gift-bearing, sometimes militarily escorted, diplomatic missions to the numerous petty states of the Western Regions. Once they had opened cordial relations in this manner, they followed with intermarriage between Chinese and members of a particular ruling family or principality of the outlying area. Then came exchange of hostages between the Han and the outlying state. When the Han had thus become established in the Western Regions, they entered more seriously into local politics and began where possible

to enthrone puppet or at least "loyal" princes. Political manipulation was followed, or accompanied, by military demonstration where it was needed and where it was possible. The policy of letting "barbarians rule barbarians" early became a cardinal feature of Han-Turkestan relations and, in many ways, it has remained so. This was important in an area so distant as the Western Regions, and in ancient days was practiced to the extent of utilizing one colonial principality in military compaigns against another and to the extreme of "permitting" native personnel to administer localities—though this often seems to have been "allowed" in cases where it could not have been prevented. In instances of severe difficulties whole populations were shifted to distant areas or, where deemed necessary, depopulated by the sword.

175
642

The pinnacle of Han administrative achievement on this frontier was the creation of the office of the *Tu-tu.* His job, Chinese history states, was to "watch" a particular outpost. He was, it is evident, an all-around colonial executive and the ancient Chinese counterpart of the Occidental Military Governor of a dependency in the pre-Pearl Harbor epoch.

T'ang Improvements

Where T'ang Chinese considerably improved upon the Han was in their attempt to convert much of the Western Regions into the administrative units used in China Proper—the *chou* and *hsien* (department and county). This meant application of customary Chinese law to the Central Asian frontier, but it did not mean abolition of the office of the Tu-tu. He still administered outlying areas. His duties, however, became in some cases more closely allied with the regional and local government machinery of China Proper than previously. By the new arrangement, also, executive machinery in the Western Regions became exceedingly complicated and broad. At one time this machinery was centered in the Tu-tu prefecture *(Tu-tu Fu)* at An-hsi (in present-day Kansu), with power said to extend from Khotan to Persia, and the following units under its direction: sixteen "states," eighty departments, one hundred eleven counties, and one hundred twenty-six military departments *(chün-fu,* also called *chi-mi chou* or "restrained" departments).

[631]

Ta Ch'ing (Manchu) policy

175 642 The situation that faced the Ch'ing Dynasty was, however, considerably different. By the Ta Ch'ing period the Khitans and the Mongols —in particular the Ölöt Mongols—had accustomed the North Road of the Western Regions to a system of widely effective overlordship. Moslem influence, on the other hand, had consolidated itself in the south. Chinese, therefore, spoke of "Four Ölöt Leagues" on the North Road and of a "Moslem League" on the South Road. These regional distinctions were complicated further by the fact that the Ölöts were exceptionally ambitious and had been expanding from the Altai southeastwards across Turfan and Kokonor as far as Lhasa.

In tackling this problem the Ch'ing first attacked Ölöt power on the southern flank, in Tibet; after ousting the Ölöt party from power there, they devastated the Road North of the Heavenly Mountains *(T'ien-shan-pei-lu)* and wiped out that Mongol stronghold. They then turned to subjugation of the weaker Moslem League in the south.

To ensure that order could be maintained, more than twenty thousand Manchu soldiers were imported into the Western Regions and stationed at I-li (Sui-ting), Yangi Hissar, and Kashgar. I-li became the central military headquarters, and a complicated new system of control was set up. It included at least a hundred special emissaries for handling tribute relations, military affairs, and rationing of food, besides a special office for Moslem affairs. All in all, the early Ch'ing emphasized military, more than political, activities in the Western Regions. The innumerable ramparts and petty military stations *(ch'eng-pao)* constructed are concrete evidence to that effect. Not only had the Ch'ing rulers resented Mongol strength in the Western Regions; they had begun to view with alarm the rise of Islam in Chinese Central Asia and to sense danger from Europe.

Tso Tsung-t'ang, who was drawn out to the Western Regions by Moslem rebellions of the late nineteenth century, made many new administrative changes there. It was he who stressed the importance of, first, Urumchi (Tihwa) and Aqsu and, second, I-li (Sui-ting) and T'a Ch'eng for control and defense of the area. He also suggested

irrigation projects, more extensive colonization, and a land survey. But most important, Tso recommended that the Western Regions be consolidated into one province, *Hsin-chiang* ("The New Dominion") or Sinkiang. By this he at last crystallized the Sinkiang frontier, on the one hand for China and on the other hand against the empires of the modern Occident. Actually the regional lines—that is to say, China's more rigid northwest national boundary and the framework for the province of Sinkiang—cut across the natural grain of traditional Central Asian life and jarred the nomad, the farmer, and the merchant there. The strategem, with local squabbles within Europe indirectly assisting, did help to counter the threats of imperialism, primarily that of Tsarist Russia.

But for at least three reasons Tso Tsung-t'ang's recommendations did not suffice. First, his major emphasis was upon the old-style Ch'ing military control which could not stand up in the face of the weapons Europe was even then beginning to fabricate. Second, his constructive measures do not seem to have been far-reaching enough in scope or in execution or to have provided suitable means of binding Sinkiang to China Proper through economic ties. Finally, the ebb of Ch'ing power which brought Republican revolt and the fall of the Dynasty in China by 1912 was bound to be felt keenly on the far-flung Sinkiang frontier.

Under the Early Republic

Tu Chung-yüan speaks of administration in Sinkiang during the early years of the Chinese Republic in this manner:

> . . . The Yang [Tseng-hsin]-Chin [Shu-jen] period was lengthy and greedy. The politician did not believe in working but only in officiating; even when he was officiating he aimed only at making money. This arose from the fact that Yang and Chin were basically that type. In general if a person were to come to Sinkiang from the interior it was not asked whether he had qualifications or not, whether he was talented or not. All that was necessary instead was that he be of an "experienced" temperament or perhaps that he had served in an office of a military governor or of a provincial government for eight to ten years so that it could be seen he had been reared in the atmosphere of slavery. . . . Or, again, if he were appointed, say as a county magis-

individual from among their number to the office of Concurrent Provincial Chairman. Sheng Shih-ts'ai was appointed to that post in 1940, and he has given it more and more of his attention since the decease of the former Provincial Chairman, Liu Wen-lung. Actually, so far as power is concerned, Sheng Shih-ts'ai seems to have dominated Sinkiang since 1933 through his military strength; the effective participation of other members in the provincial committee seems to have largely been subject to his approval, and in many respects the ratification of his and their appointments by national authorities has been mostly a matter of form.

Statements as to the administrative organization of Sinkiang areas do not always jibe. But Tu Chung-yüan writes, and other authorities seem to substantiate, that there are nine principal administrative regions in the province: Tihwa Ch'ü (including the capital of the same name), I-li Ch'ü, T'a Ch'eng Ch'ü, Ha-mi Ch'ü, A Shan Ch'ü, Yen-ch'i Ch'ü, K'o-shih Ch'ü, and Khotan Ch'ü. According to Tu there are administrative officers over these, each of which includes a number of counties. There are, he states, seventy-two counties in all Sinkiang.

It is hard to tell how effectively this *Ch'ü* and *Hsien* (Region and County) system has been working in Sinkiang. In the past such governmental forms have worked better in the oasis settlements than in the outlying pastures, but have on the whole been subordinated to varying local tribal customs when the two systems came into practical conflict. Where relations between provincial officials and non-Chinese-speaking races have become too complicated, native headmen speaking Chinese have in the past served as "middlemen."

So far as the national allegiance of Sinkiang is concerned, let any doubts be immediately dispelled. The name of the province indicates that it is a part of the territory subject to the laws of the Chinese National Government and the officials and people of both Sinkiang and the Chinese Republic as a whole operate accordingly. Both as Commander-in-Chief of Border Defense and as Provincial Chairman in Sinkiang Sheng Shih-ts'ai is formally an appointee of the Executive Yüan of the Chinese National Government. The fact that he is allotted and accepts such national titles is significant evidence that neither he

642 nor the National Government wants Sinkiang and her officialdom to be other than Chinese in name.

648 The Chinese National Government may not, it is true, always have been able to do what it liked in Sinkiang since Sheng Shih-ts'ai achieved power. It appears, from Chinese testimony, that Sheng has in the past negotiated with foreign powers without conforming to customary national procedure, and that his administration has also excluded Chinese of other provinces from Sinkiang territory and has found ways at times to circumvent—if not necessarily to disobey—National Government regulations.

This situation gave a certain credence to distasteful accusations in regard to Soviet Russian influence in the province. After China and Soviet Russia signed their Non-aggression Agreement in 1937 Tokyo quarters fanned rumors that China had been forced to give up Sinkiang as a concession to Soviet Russia. Since then—and especially at the turn of 1939 and 1940 when Russia was advancing her armies into Poland, Finland, Esthonia, Lithuania, and Latvia—like sources often hinted at the "invasion" of Sinkiang by Soviet troops.

I have no first-hand evidence by which I can prove that such reports are false, but I believe in their falsity. I saw many Soviet Russian "volunteer" troops in Lan-chou, Kansu (adjacent to Sinkiang Province), when I was in China in 1939 and 1940, and there could have been more such troops in Sinkiang. But in late 1939, on the other hand, I also visited Sining, Ch'inghai, which is west of Lan-chou and between Kansu and Sinkiang, and I did not see Soviet Russian troops there. After weighing available evidence, I do not believe that Soviet Russian troops have been in "occupation" of Sinkiang or have been "controlling" it during the years since Sheng Shih-ts'ai summoned their aid to put down Sinkiang rebellion. I do not even believe that they were "occupying" it before the widely publicized reports of October, 1943, came forth proclaiming the "withdrawal" of Soviet Russia from Sinkiang. It is admitted that there have been many Soviet advisers in Sinkiang in a number of capacities, civilian and military, in that period; and among them there may have been Soviet "volunteer" soldiers and

aviation pilots. But there is not justification for saying that such "volunteers" and advisers ever made Sinkiang a Soviet dependency. 648

Indeed the evidence seems to demonstrate that, far from being a Soviet Russian "puppet," Sheng Shih-ts'ai has been one of the most far-sighted, enlightened, and independent military leaders of modern China. The Chinese colonial record in Sinkiang was not very praiseworthy up to Sheng's appearance on the scene. He was able to assay the needs of the situation and the resources at his command; he was also competent enough to make constructive use of opportunities offered him. The Six Great Policies and especially the program of Sinkiang reconstruction which Sheng Shih-ts'ai fashioned out of the rough clay of the Moslem revolt of the 1930's indicate that he has had at heart the interests of both Sinkiang and China. That he has been able to turn these interests into a positive program which did not completely sacrifice China's title to the province but which brought to Sinkiang instead much of the best qualities of both China and of neighboring Soviet Russia is truly an amazing achievement, too long unappreciated by the outside world.

It was inevitable that Sheng Shih-ts'ai's New Sinkiang should have been influenced by Soviet Russian ideas, personnel, and materials. Developments in neighboring Soviet areas had so drawn the attention and admiration of Sinkiang people by 1933 that a feeble Chinese version of an outmoded military or economic imperialism not only might have fallen flat but might have flung the province—politically as well as economically—into Soviet Russia's perhaps embarrassed lap.

Sheng Shih-ts'ai is no puppet and the New Sinkiang is no political 642
dependency of Soviet Russia. Sinkiang instead has incorporated Chinese ideas of loose political authority with the Soviet creed of cultural and economic autonomy. From the two has come a unique Chinese frontier political economy. From them also the basically non-Han Chinese people of Sinkiang have gained new opportunities of livelihood, and by the combination much of the old bitterness between Han and non-Han has been removed.

SN 311 The newest development, found in the Northwest, especially in Sinkiang, is the partial industrialization of those areas which are the sources of coal, oil, gold, iron, alum, quartz, gypsum, nitrates, salt, and as recently reported, uranium.

SN 563 The non-Chinese peoples of the Northwest are not only outnumbered b ut also outweighed in economic and political respects. For more than two thousand years, the Chinese have been ruling those areas (with short interruptions as far as Sinkiang and Chinghai are concerned), even though they never had more than a few garrisons stationed in frontier areas. Those garrisons made it possible for a thin stratum of Chinese officials to rule the areas on the top level. On the lower level, the indigenous peoples and tribes governed themselves - under the supervision of the Chinese viceroys or governors and their bureaucracy.

SN 175 642 197 631 The general policy of the Chinese government in Peking was to make use of the existing form of governmental institutions of frontier areas like Sinkiang, Chinghai, and Inner-Mongolia. In Sinkiang (prior to 1884 it was called "Hui-chiang," i.e., Muslimic Dominion), two types of local government had existed: the Muslimic type and the Mongolian type. The S [171] Northern and Northeastern part of Sinkiang, where the Mongols were the dominant inhabitants, had the same governmental institutions as Outer and Inner-Mongolia, namely, banners ruled by dzasaks, who were appointees of the Emperor in SN [668] [565] Peking. The Republic of China tacitly recognized their ranks and interfered very little with their functions. Only Communist China deprived the nomad aristocracy of their titles and rights.

175 631 795 649 657 The Muslimic communities were fuled by Bäks with various ranks: the Ak'im Bäk, "local governor"; the Ishkhan Bäk, "assistant governor"; the Shang Bäk, "collector of revenue"; the Qazi, "judge"; the Kukbashi or Mirabu Bäk, "superintendant of agriculture"; Yüzbashi, "hundred-men-leader"; Onbashi, "ten-men-leader"; etc. All the local Bäks were appointed by the emperor or later on by the president of the Republic upon the recommendation of the Imperial or Republican governor, although it must be stated that some governors of Sinkiang, Chin Shu-jen and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, ruled and governed the SN province without asking Peking for the consent of appointments.

175 631 649 [202] 000 Besides the Chinese civil service there existed Chinese military staffs and detachments, centered in Ili, Urumchi, Kulja, Chuguchak, Kashghar, Sining, Su-chou, Lan-chou, etc. Relay stations provided communication between the government in Peking and the frontier areas. Maintaining the effectiveness of the means of communications was an important duty of Chinese officials. Only since 1930 have some automobile highways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation

S
N **E. Population Problems**

563 1. Traditional Antagonism Between the Moslems and the Chinese

578 669 648 175 Of the many problems in regard to the population of Northwest China, the traditional antagonism between the Moslems and the Chinese, together with its international complications, is by far the most serious. Moslem uprisings have been frequent and often caused great massacres on both sides. In most cases the Moslem disturbances are supported and made use of by ambitious neighboring powers, particularly Russia - both Tsarist and Soviet. In 1871 Tsarist Russia used the 1861-1874 Moslem disturbance as a pretext to occupy the Ili Valley and then force China to cede the lower part of the Valley, west of Khargos to Russia. Time and again Russia took advantage of Moslem troubles in Sinkiang to make some special territorial, political and economic demands in the provinces, i.e., free trade in Sinkiang by the Ili Commercial Treaty of 1851 and the cession of the territory west of Tarbagatai by the treaty of Chuguchak (Ta-cheng) in 1864.

S
648 Sinkiang had always been a center of international intrigue between Russia and Britain for the spoils of Central Asia, as well as the barometer of power relations between Russia and China. (See Foreign Relations).

S 2. The Uighur Autonomy

642 199 [668] Under the Chinese Communist Regime, Sinkiang became the Uighur Autonomous Area in September, 1955. A National Autonomy for Sinkiang was first recommended by General Chang Chih-chung, a liberal Nationalist Government high official in 1946-49. He was "influenced by views of American politicians who insisted that the principle of self-government should be applied to Sinkiang also - an illusory wish for a people which stood between Russia and China, like a mouse between two cats." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955).

S
167 708 466 A continuous great influx of Chinese to Sinkiang has occurred, which is particularly marked by the present-day Army Construction Corps and the presence of the Corrective Labor Force. The soldiers are sent to meet the urgent demand of labor to undertake the gigantic construction program and the latter, estimated at several hundred thousands, are condemned to forced labor in the thinly populated border areas. (See: Labor).

S
642 668 199 "Since the Chinese Communist troops entered Sinkiang, the rulers have always been Chinese, and at present, with the introduction of autonomy, this Chinese domination is the more emphasized." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955). Furthermore, Government officials are transferred from Peking to Sinkiang in large numbers. On August 21, 1955, seventy-nine officials from the "First Grade Offices" of the Central Government left Peking for Sinkiang; at the same time

642 668 177 it was announced that altogether 1,000 officials from the same offices (the majority of them Party and Youth Corps members of whom one tenth are higher officials), will be transferred to Sinkiang to serve in the Regional County and Ch'ü offices and in the Economic Projects. (People's Daily, August 21, 1955).

The politico-economical development of Sinkiang follows the same pattern as that of the interior of China. All the detailed facts of using Chinese in party meetings, introducing a new currency in place of Sinkiang currency, etc., show that Autonomous Sinkiang is an integral part of China. The sufferers in the whole process are the aboriginal inhabitants of Sinkiang for they are expected to make the greatest sacrifices, greater even than those of the population of the rest of China, for the economic and military strengthening of the Communist world.

668 631 177 162 At the beginning of the new regime in 1949, Sinkiang was called (as it had been under the Nationalist Government) a province - divided into ten special districts and these were subdivided into seventy-nine counties. In 1954, Five Autonomous "Chou" were established. Four of them were established in July, 1954. They contain three counties each, while the former special Districts contained, on an average, ten counties each. The population of three of these Autonomous "Chou" is 57,000 , 98,000 and 135,000. Three of the Autonomous "Chou" were Mongolian and the other two were Moslem. In November, 1954, the largest Autonomous "Chou" was established in the Ili Valley, called the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Area with a population of 70,000 (P. D. December 6, 1954, or NCNA December 2, 1954).

On September 20, 1955, it was stated that the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region was to replace "Sinkiang Province." It was also announced that the establishment of the smaller Autonomous "Chou" within Sinkiang had now been concluded with the establishment of five Autonomous Chou and six Autonomous Counties (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 14, 1955).

In fact, however, the population in these Autonomous Chou and Autonomous Counties does not exceed 500,000, which is less than one tenth of the total population of Sinkiang which is officially set at 4,780,000 people. (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 15, 1955). Thus the extension of autonomous rule is limited - a sign that the erection of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Area itself has only a token significance in spite of the fact that the Uighurs number 3.6 million constituting seventy to eighty percent of the total population of the province.

631 131 668 177 The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region is not an easily accessible area. In the past, its geographical isolation has been aggravated by the seclusion policy of the Communist regime for

C. The Kirghiz

563 1. The people

Taking Tien-shan as a whole, the Kirghiz form the leading [771] element of the population. They are Mohammedans of the Suni order, but they are not strict followers of their religion. Their [642] system of government is patriarchal, control of the different [622] sections being vested in tribal elders who enjoy almost unlimited authority. The elders (Manap) are chosen by the people, and regarded with honor and respect.

[233] The people are nomads whose main occupation is cattle rais- [241] ing. Only a small proportion of the population engages in farming.

563 2. Patterns of living
342 a. Dwelling

The Kirghiz do not live in houses. The poor live in shelters [184] made of branches under trees or against overhanging rocks. The rich live in tents, smaller and less ornate than the Mongolian yurt but more solid with thick layers of felt. A light tent is called an aq-ai. It stands a gale very well, as the shape is such that a high wind presses the structure even more firmly to the ground. To make it more stable, a large stone is placed in the tent and the woodwork of the roof is anchored to it by a rope.

The shape and structure of an aq-ai are similar to those of [354] the Mongolian yurt, but the interior arrangement differs. A fire always burns cheerily in the middle and a cauldron of mash [353] simmers upon it. At the far end is the kitchen, which is screened by gaily colored mats of reeds tightly wound with dyed wool. [251] Here the housewife stores her milk, cream and curds in vast wooden bowls. When the weather is wet, a row of young lambs [231] occupies one corner of the tent. They are tethered closely to a rope pegged down along the walls. Saddlebags, sieves, hats, [353] wool, coats, skins and so forth are hung along the tent walls. Piles of rolled-up felts and rugs occupy about a quarter of the circumference of the tent. The wealth of the owner may be guessed from the size of the piles.

563 The interior decoration in the tent of a wealthy Kirghiz is
342 often artistic. The walls are hung with embroideries made by
352 the women, and the ground is covered with carpets. There are
353 also pillows covered with multi-colored chintz of Chinese or Russian manufacture. Furniture is not generally used. There is [415] an occasional table, a few copper pots and pans, and some brass jugs used for boiling water and making tea.

563 b. Food
262 Staple foods for the Kirghiz are barley, bread, milk and its
252 products, such as sour cream and qurut, a kind of cheese. In most tents there are cauldrons of brewing mash, a mixture of flour and milk. Qurut is made by drying sour cream in goatskin.

S
N
795
559
485
114

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

apparent trade of innkeeping was simply a cover for another and more lucrative business." (p. 73).

S
N
842
795
771
177
N
*563
S
563

Like the Chinese, the sinicized Moslems are very much concerned with the problem of offspring. To them continuity of life is bound up with that prolongation of existence which a son secures, one who carries on the life which he owes to his parents. This is a completely Chinese concept. The Chinese-speaking Moslems cannot understand and would certainly not accept the Christian faith that life after death is God's gift, that one does not depend upon a son and his worship, and that immortality means the soul or spirit living eternally in Heaven. Miss Cable records in her book: "We talked often of these things, but it was hard for them to understand what I told them, and they would turn it off with one excuse or another. 'She is different from us', they said, 'her life is given up to God's work and her merit will secure her an entrance to Paradise'. Some envied, some pitied, some just stared and made no effort to understand, others summed it up in these words: 'Eastern ways are for the East, Western ways are for the West.'" (p. 75).

N
*563
177
181
[669]
S
563
177
181
[669]
S
563
642
643
177

The Chinese-speaking Moslems in the Northwest, in spite of their having taken up a considerable amount of the Chinese way of life, are deeply conscious of racial and religious inadaptability to Chinese rules. Most of them are always rebellious. They alwasy think that they are oppressed or unfairly treated by the Chinese authorities. For this reason, Moslem revolts occur in the Northwest frequently. For example, the immediate cause of the the 1930 revolt was, according to Miss Cable's account, the suspicion of the Moslems that the Chinese Government was to change their age-old social and political system and that the Chinese population in the area goat many advantages at the expense of the Moslems. Up to 1930 the Moslems in the Hami district of Sinkiang were always governed by a ruler of their own race, religion and speech. The last one of their rulers was Khan Maksud Shah. This ruler died during the year 1930. The Chinese Sinkiang Government took this opportunity to end the Moslem system and the succession of the Khan was not allowed to continue. Maksud's son, Nazir, heir to the throne was summoned to report at Urumchi, then capital of the Sinkiang Provincial Government, and Yolbars, the Tiger Prince, was ordered to appear with him. This was bad news for the Moslem inhabitants. Later, a word came from the capital that the young prince had been made a prisoner in his own lodging, and that there were to be many changes in the standing of the Turki people. When Yolbars returned to Hami he left Nazir in Urumchi, and arrived in company with a band of Chinese officials who at once sat down to business and drew up a list of changes which were to be introduced in the administration of the Moslem community. The old administration

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

S 563 642 643 199 829 The old administration of the Khan was not always liked by the Moslems, but he and his people were one, and they understood each other well. His Oriental style of court life was appreciated by the Turkis, and the Khan, by virtue of his hereditary title, was unquestionably accepted by them. There was immediate resentment among the populace at the suggested changes, and the resentment became the more bitter when a great display of highly organized officialdom was made.

S 563 199 631 642 829 [423] At the same time, the whole area of Hami was carefully surveyed and the land redistributed. Three large administrative districts were arranged and given names which dated back to the Han dynasty. The new government was to be wholly in Chinese hands, and the old Khanate system was to vanish. Chinese magistrates were appointed to hear the law cases and Chinese tax-collectors were to levy the dues and convey them to the capital, where they would be allocated to the respective departments. These propositions all seem legitimate to the Chinese authority and they were presented to the people as improved measures of justice; but the Moslems did not like them and had a great deal of suspicion towards them. There was also the rumor that some unappropriated land which the Turki farmers would have liked to use was given to the Chinese and that arrears of taxes from which the Chinese were exempt were demanded from Moslem landowners.

S [669] Suddenly that dangerous thing so well known to the Oriental as a "breath of fury" rose fiercely among men who had hitherto dealt only with their own Khan, and they unanimously determined on revolt.

N 829 565 Fan Ch'ang-chiang, a well-known journalist connected with the most influential Chinese daily Ta Kung Pao in the prewar period and now editor of the People's Daily in Peking, reported, after a trip to the Northwest in 1936 through Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and Ninghsia, that the common people, especially the peasants in

N [651] Kansu, all had a very bad impression of the government. Because there were so many kinds of taxes, the people thought that the government had nothing to do but to collect taxes from the common

N 565 181 562 829 people. The people did not trust the government. In regard to social customs Fan says that the Chinese in Kansu are very conservative in matters which have anything to do with their women. Even middle-aged women of respectable families can hardly have anny opportunity to be seen by or to be spoken to by any man who is not a relative or a neighbor. Young ladies must absolutely not be seen by strangers. Soldiers who have come from the coastal provinces and who are accustomed to more liberal relations between the two sexes were resented by the local people because

N 565 829 181 they acted rather freely toward their women folk. Notwithstanding their bad impression of the government and their resentment toward the "outside" soldiers, the common Chinese in Kansu are

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1
China AF1

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

I. The Historical Background

When the Communists conquered Northwest China, they created a Northwestern administrative area, which included the five provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sinkiang. In 1954, the Communist Government abolished Ninghsia Province and put it under the jurisdiction of Kansu. In 1955 it changed Sinkiang Province into the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. So now, Northwest China includes three provinces, namely, Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and one autonomous region, Sinkiang.

Historically speaking, Shensi and Kansu were under one governor-general during the Manchu Dynasty. For many purposes, such as provincial examinations, the two provinces were handled as a unit. At that time, part of Chinghai and Ninghsia were considered to belong to Kansu. While most of Sinkiang was administered under a special military government system, its eastern strip, from Tihua (Urumchi) to Hami, was under the jurisdiction of the governor-general of Shen-Kan. When Sinkiang later was made a province, it absorbed all the territory west of Hami.

Under the Nationalist Government, the Kokonor area was separated from Kansu. It became the nucleus of the Province of Chinghai, which was established in 1928. During the same year the Nationalist Government also established Ninghsia Province by uniting the northern counties of Kansu along the Yellow River with the two Mongolian Banners, Alashan and Edsin. Thus, when the Communist Government abolished Ninghsia as a province by combining it with Kansu, it merely reestablished part of the old border line.

During most of the Manchu Dynasty, Sinkiang was a special area. The local people retained a high degree of self-government. Even after the area was established as a province, the Chinese government let the local leaders handle most of the business of their own people. Thus, the establishment of an autonomous region in Sinkiang also had a historical basis.

II. The Constitutional Systems

A. Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic

In October of 1927, Mao Tse-tung retreated to the border area of Hunan and Kiangsi. There he established the "Hunan-Kiangsi Border Region Worker-Peasant Government". This was the beginning of the Chinese Soviet Government. After the Communists had consolidated their position, they established a "Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic". This was a Communist constitution for a Communist government. After suffering severe losses from Nationalist attacks, the Chinese Communists were no longer able

N
*175 *668 631 *563 lishment of the Hai-pei Tibetan Autonomous People's Government in Chinghai came only after the "achievement of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Government at upper level."

"On entering the Tibetan area in Hai-pei in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party and the cadres of the People's Government exerted great efforts in propaganda, thoroughly carried out policies concerning national equality, unity and the development of production, mediated disputes... and stabilized social order." (NCNA June 18, 1954).

As one after another of the national autonomous areas proved satisfactory, from the point of view of the Communists, more were established. Following the establishment of the T'ien-chu Tibetan Autonomous district in Kansu in May, 1950, eight autonomous districts were established in 1950: five in Kansu, two in Ninghsia, and one in Chinghai. Three were established in the years 1951 and 1952, all in Chinghai. Fifteen were set up in 1953: six in Kansu, two in N nghsia, and eight in Chinghai. Of the total of 27 autonomous districts set up by the end of 1953, 14 were Tibetan, five Chinese Moslem (Hui), four Mongol, and four others. Including the smaller autonomous areas, there were a total of over forty autonomous people's governments in the three provinces of Kansu, Chinghai, and Ninghsia, by August, 1953. Their size varied. In Chinghai, the Kung-ho Kazakh autonomous hsiang had a total population of 130 and the Huang-nan Tibetan Autonomous district a population of 220,000. These nationality autonomous areas in the three provinces embraced a total of 700,000 people, or one-ninth of the non-Chinese population in the Northwest (NCNA August 29, 1953 and September 9, 1953; but one million according to Ma Ming-fang, Ch'in-chung jih-pao, January 1, 1954).

S
175 668 642 563 631 The people of Sinkiang, who constituted the bulk of the non-Chinese population in the Northwest, were, up to fall of 1953, four years after the Communist conquest, not granted the privilege of self-rule. Some of the reasons for the discrimination of Sinkiang were quite obvious.

1. The propinquity of the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai and the predominance of the Chinese population made it easier for the Communists to exercise control. Sinkiang, on the other hand, was farther from China and the bulk of the population was non-Chinese with a long tradition of resistance to Chinese rule.

S
175 668 563 631 2. In Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, Chinese cadres far outnumbered the native cadres, but in Sinkiang, according to one source (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 30, 1955), 67 per cent of the cadres were native cadres, including 17,000 of them who had taken part in the Ili Revolt in 1944-45. The fact that they still entertained separatist views may be seen in the fact that Saifuddin, their leader, found it necessary to remind them: "From now on, the

S
175 Chinese-owned companies. Although Soviet and Eastern European
648 experts were retained as salaried technicians, the move was made to appear that Soviet Russia was withdrawing from Sinkiang in favor of Communist China.

S
175 In addition to these conditions, there was a whole plethora of
668 other factors which made the Communist authorities reluctant to
642 grant regional autonomy to the people of Sinkiang. However, as
631 they had in repeated pronouncements promised autonomy to the
563 non-Chinese inhabitants of this province, they found that they could not procrastinate any longer, and in the late summer of 1953 they finally agreed to the establishment of the first autonomous people's governments in Sinkiang, but on an experimental basis. The three experimental autonomous governments were: one for the Sibo on the hsiang level, one for the Chinese Moslems on the county level, and one for the Mongols on the district (ch'ü)level. In December, 1953, Saifuddin urged "that a good job must be done to guarantee that the various national autonomies in the province may be established." (Ch'un-chung jih-pao, January 6, 1954).

The experiments proved successful and by May, 1954, the green light was given for the establishment of autonomous people's governments in Sinkiang for other concentrations of national minorities in the province. There were thirty-three autonomous areas below the level of district in Sinkiang in August (NCNA, August 7, 1954). However, in proportion to its population of non-Chinese people, Sinkiang was still behind. During the same period, the number of autonomous areas in Kansu had increased to 86 (NCNA April 9, 1955).

N
*175 C. The General Election of 1953-54
*668 In 1953, the people of Northwest China, as elsewhere in China,
666 were for the first time permitted to cast their votes for the elec-
(641) tion of their representatives. In February, the Central People's Government in Peking passed the Election Law which provided for suffrage for adults over 18 years of age with the exclusion of all those whom the Communist authorities had classified as landlords, counter-revolutionaries, and lunatics and those who were deprived of the right to vote or to run for election. The certified voters vote only once, at the lowest or basic levels, and by a show of hands (art. 55). The system is pyramidal. The representatives chosen by the people at the basic election elect their representatives to people's congresses of a higher level, and these in turn elect representatives for peoples of still higher level, and so on up, through the levels of county and district people's congresses to municipal and provincial congresses, and through the level of municipal and provincial congresses to the National People's Congress. Only at high levels was the balloting secret. The candidates running for election were Communist or men approved by the

175 178 668 Sinkiang: Party work was also slow in this province. Although at the end of 1953, it was reported that 75.68 per cent of the 6,400 new Party members were recruited from the national minorities, only 26.1 per cent of the responsible personnel in party committees of county level and higher were natives. The Chinese members still predominated. As to the New Democratic Youth League, there were in 1955 a total of 57,228 members in Sinkiang, and this organization supplied 3,900 of its members to the Chinese Communist Party.

Compared to the rest of Sinkiang, the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou did much better in the recruitment of party members. From 1950 to March, 1955, it recruited a total of 1,100 new party members from the activists.

VII. Formation of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region

A. Extend and Limitations of Regional Autonomy

175 668 642 563 199 The expansion of Chinese Communist Party membership, the transfer of local cadres to the work of cooperative-building in the rural areas and the collectivization of the people, the relegation of native cadres to unimportant government posts, and the influx of hordes of cadres and workers from China Proper to take over the governments and state enterprises were preliminary steps preparatory to the conferring of regional autonomy to the non-Chinese population of Sinkiang. Self-rule has been an objective for which the minority peoples of Chinese Turkestan aspired and struggled, and the promises of self-determination and self-government were the chief planks of the political platform of the Chinese Communists. However, the definition of what constitutes autonomy for the minority peoples has undergone evolution.

As early as 1930, Mao Tse-tung had declared that the non-Chinese racial minorities "have a right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their own independent state, or to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or to form an autonomous region of the Chinese Soviet Republic." (The Soviets in China, p. 440 quoted in Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 115). This was incorporated in Article 14 of the constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic promulgated in 1931, with the omission of the right to join the USSR.

The Chinese Communists reaffirmed their promise of autonomy to the nationality minorities when they came to power in 1949, but autonomy was to be within the federal framework of the Chinese People's Republic and no mention was made of the right of secession by the non-Chinese minorities. The Common Program adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September, 1949, promised only regional self-government and preservation of the language, religion and culture of the minority peoples,

175 and equality and prohibition of discrimination.
177 The policies of the Chinese Communists were incorporated
668 into the "General Program for the enforcement of nationalities
642 regional autonomy" which was promulgated in August, 1952,
563 along with two supplementary documents, one for the enforcement of local nationalities democratic coalition governments and the other for the protection of the equality and interests of the national minorities. Article 2 of chapter one of the General Program declared explicitly that the nationality regional autonomous areas were local administrations under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and the leadership of higher level people's governments. Chapter four provides for the "rights" of autonomy, which include the acquiescence to the leadership personnel, the use of their own language and literature, and the privilege of having their "patriotic" activists promoted to be cadres. No mention was made of the right of the nationalities to initiate legislation, and matters of finances, public security forces and militia were under the control of the Central People's Government. Chapter five stipulated that the minorities should love the Chinese and love and support the Chinese People's Republic, and chapter six stated that they should follow the leadership of governments of a higher level.

These provisions were incorporated into the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted in October, 1954, which, in article 2, reiterated that the autonomous regions were inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China. Autonomy for the minority peoples, thus defined, meant only the preservation of the language and literature of the minority peoples. The autonomous regions were actually in the same status as a Chinese province, with no legislative powers of their own and no freedom from supervision and control of the Central Government. The love of and adhesion to the fatherland was reaffirmed and no separatist movements permitted from "the great family of the fatherland."

B. Autonomy for Sinkiang

Since autonomy for the national minorities, as conceived by the Chinese Communist who in turn copied it from Soviet Russia, was autonomy in name only and a sham, it was not likely to satisfy the people of Chinese Turkestan, with their tradition for independence and their aspirations for self-government. To quiet them, the provincial governor Burkhan Shahidi, in an article denouncing pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism as destructive to the "fraternal and cooperative family" of China, told his people that they did not qualify for national independence. "It is conceivable," he said, "that people who speak the Turkish language may not form a nation as they lack common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychology. Similarly, people who believe in Islam do

175 not ipso facto form a nation." And, he went on, "At this juncture,
177 any national movement which seeks separation from the Chinese
668 People's Republic for independence will be reactionary since...
642 it would undermine the interests of the various races and particu-
563 larly the foremost majority of the race concerned (that is, the Chinese), and thus would work to the advantage of imperialism." (JMJP October 2, 1951).

175 Later, in June, 1953, Burkhan enumerated the prerequisite
177 conditions for Sinkiang to achieve autonomy within the framework
668 of the Chinese People's Republic. The future Sinkiang autonomous
642 area, he said, must "be an inseparable part of the People's
[563] Republic of China and the autonomous areas of minority nationalities in Sinkiang are likewise inseparable parts of Sinkiang and the People's Republic of China."

The formation of autonomous governments in nationality areas, declared Burkhan, was contingent not only on having a large number of representatives and nationality cadres in these areas but also on the representatives and cadres of other nationalities in the governments, and he went on to explain that by other nationalities, he meant the Han Chinese cadres, whose presence was necessary because the native peoples were politically and culturally backward. "Autonomous organs at various levels should retain a certain number of Han Chinese cadres."

A third condition for the establishment of regional autonomy was the extent of the organization of the people. "It is imperative," he said, "to conduct more penetratively and extensively publicity and education to the people of all nationalities on patriotism and Sino-Soviet friendship."

Fourthly, he told the people of Chinese Turkestan, they should not be impatient and resentful just because other nationalities in the Northwest had already been granted regional autonomy. Regional autonomy in Sinkiang had to be achieved in five stages; at the hsiang and ch'ü level, at the county level, at the district level, at the administrative district level, and finally, at the provincial level with the Uighur as the principal constituent.

Burkhan, in conclusion, pointed to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region as "the example of the advantages of exercising autonomy in nationality areas," and "the perfect example for other minority nationalities in the implementation of autonomy in the future." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 20, 1953).

[563] By fall of 1954, the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Central People's Government in Peking was satisfied with the "notable progress made in substantiating minority self-government organs," which included the promotion of large numbers of native cadres from the activists, the staffing of the governments with cadres, the use of the languages of the minorities, and "in some localities, armed forces of indigenous peoples have been built

under the leadership of the local party and government organs." (JMJP, August 28, 1954).

Finally, in August, 1955, when out of the total of thirty-three autonomous areas in Sinkiang below the rank of districts, four were raised to the status of chou and six to the status of districts, it was announced that Sinkiang would be made into the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region in September.

Large numbers of dignitaries journeyed from Peking to attend the second session of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Conference at Urumchi, where the change in the status of Sinkiang was proclaimed on September 20. Among them was vice-premier Tung Pi-wu, who, in his address, told the local leaders that the bases for the establishment of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region lay in elevation of the patriotism and socialist consciousness of the people, the training and employment of large numbers of cadres, and on the degree of unity among the nationalities. To preserve and consolidate the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, he said, the people of Sinkiang must (1) welcome the assistance of the Han Chinese cadres, (2) actively assist the other nationality autonomous areas in construction, (3) pay serious attention to education in patriotism and socialism and prevent the tendency of great nation and provincial nationalism, and (4) consolidate national unity and wipe out the counter-revolutionaries. (NCNA September 21, 1955).

Burkhan, in his speech, elaborated on the statements of Tung Pi-wu by saying that the main task of the Chinese Communist Party on the problem of nationalities during the transitional period was to consolidate the unity of the fatherland and the solidarity among the nationalities in a common effort to build the big family of the fatherland and to follow the centralized leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Communist Party and the provincial people's government. Just as the Uighurs, who are the majority people in Sinkiang, need the help and support of the Han Chinese of China Proper, so the other minority peoples, such as the Kazakhs in Ili, need the help and support of the Uighurs.

"With the establishment of the Uighur autonomous region in Sinkiang, we should all the more warmly welcome the sincere and selfless help extended by the Han Chinese and cadres of brother nationalities. This is because the Han Chinese and their cadres have gone through a long period of revolutionary training and experience.... Only under the unified guidance of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, and the party committee in the autonomous region as well as the warm help of the Han Chinese and cadres, and further efforts to consolidate and strengthen unity among the

175 nationalities, will it be possible for Sinkiang nationalities to exer-
177 cise fully the rights of being masters of their own domain and
668 vigorously develop the political and cultural activities in the
642 Autonomous Region." (NCNA September 24, 1955).
563 On October 1, 1955, the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region officially came into being. The last act of the Sinkiang People's
[666] Congress was the election of the 37-man people's council of the new Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (the names of the members have not yet been published). Saifuddin, the vice-chairman of the erstwhile provincial council, was elected chairman of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, but at the end of the month he resigned and Burkhan, the former chairman was reelected chairman. The vice-chairmen included Kao Chin-shun, former vice-chairman, and two natives, a Uighur and a Kazakh.

The Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, formerly subordinated to the Northwest Bureau, was made independent and renamed the Sinkiang Committee, but the party officials remained unchanged. The first secretary was Wang En-mao, a native of Kiangsi who spoke none of the local languages, the second secretary was Kao Chin-shun, concurrently vice-chairman of the autonomous region, the third secretary was Chang Pang-ying. Only the fourth secretary, Saifuddin, was a native. These men had held their positions since 1949. Both the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Sinkiang party committee thus came directly under the control of Peking.

VIII. Prospects

175 The formation of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region
177 brings to a close an important phase in the political domination of
668 the Northwest by the Chinese Communists. By 1955, under the intensive program of party expansion and the staffing of the governments by party men and by tried and tested cadres, the provinces of Shensi, Kansu and Chinghai were already under effective Communist control. The United Front of the period of "New Democracy" came to an end with the transition of the country to socialism. The non-Communists in the government were cowed and eliminated. Those who survived the purges of 1952 were weeded out in the
[642] elections of 1953-54. The granting of autonomy to the Uighurs and other minority peoples in Chinese Turkestan was to placate their discontent and to satisfy their yearning for self-rule, but it was rigged in such a manner as to make the domination of the Chinese Communists over Sinkiang and its ties with China Proper firmer and stronger than that accomplished by any governments in the past.

However, the efforts of the Chinese Communists to consolidate and centralize their control over the Northwest provinces are still impeded, internally, by the clash of interests within the ranks